NO TRADE—PRO TRADE
The Great Debate

A report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reveals that environmental crime is now the world’s fourth-largest crime sector behind drug smuggling, counterfeiting and human trafficking. Even more concerning is that environmental crime is growing at a rate two to three times faster than the global economy. By virtue of its highly secretive underground nature, it is hard to place an exact value on environmental crime, but it is thought to total anywhere from US$91 to US$258 billion annually – a thousand times more than the money spent on combating it. UNEP estimates the illegal wildlife component of this to be in the range of US$7–23 billion a year.

Combating such crime is made all the more difficult because there is no legal standard across all nations – a crime might be punished harshly in one country, while in another it might be regarded as little more than a misdemeanor. Criminals are quick to exploit this lack of international consensus, using one country to conduct poaching, another to prepare merchandise, and one or more transit countries to move the goods to their consumer destinations. Endemic corruption in many parts of the world is another major enabling factor behind the illegal trade in wildlife. 

There is clearly a need for far greater political will, legal uniformity and cross-border cooperation for any crackdown on environmental crime to be successful in the longer term.

The ramifications of environmental crime are huge, for it compromises the already over-extended resources of the planet, robs future generations not only of wealth, but also health and wellbeing, and it poses a serious threat to global security. UN reports indicate that the ill-gotten proceeds from crimes against nature support armed groups and quite possibly terrorists as well. For example, the US International Conservation Caucus Foundation (ICCF) states that “Ivory and rhino horn are gaining popularity as a source of income for some of Africa’s most notorious armed groups, including Somalia’s al-Shabab, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and Darfur’s Janjaweed … Wildlife products have become a substantial source of income for terrorist organizations in Africa.” 

The association between ivory smuggling, extremist organizations in Africa and global terrorism stems largely from two sources: a 2011 report by the Elephant Action League that refers to al-Shabaab earning as much as 40 per cent of its revenues from ivory; and ”Warlords of Ivory”, a 2015 documentary from National Geographic, which investigates links between the ivory trade in Africa and militias and terrorist networks. 

Such contentions are viewed as somewhat misleading by other commentators, however, and this is well articulated in the Conservation Watch article “Militarised conservation, wildlife trade and global terrorism”.  The article highlights that: “although it is true that murderous regional militias like the Lord’s Resistance Army and Sudan’s Janjaweed deal in illegal ivory, unlike the Shabab, Boko Haram or the Islamic State, they do not have an expansionist ideology with international aspirations.”

And in a paper entitled “An Illusion of Complicity Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa”, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) states that: “Evidence for Al-Shabaab involvement in poaching and trafficking remains extremely limited and controversial … This is a cause for concern: such a narrative risks diverting attention from the trade’s main facilitators and, counter-intuitively, from Al-Shabaab’s known funding sources.”

The paper contends that while the links between the ivory trade (and by association the illegal rhino horn trade) and global terrorism form a “powerful narrative, espoused by some politicians”, it is largely wrong and based on unverified sources. The inference is that the ivory trade and global terrorism are separate problems and that conflating them undermines the strategies against both.

Knowing the current value of rhino horn is also arguably important in law – in assessing the seriousness of a smuggling crime, for instance. 

There is published research on the matter and much speculation as well – any casual online search will render a range of putative values of rhino horn. This being so, does it really matter if such information – speculative or otherwise – is bandied about? Possibly not, but the African Rhino Specialist Group specifically asks writers and editors to refrain from doing so as speculation, which by the very illegal nature market is inherently wildly inaccurate, could have serious unintended consequences. Rhino Review respects this appeal.

• poaching and the illegal trade would be stimulated and that new criminal networks might possibly be tempted into horn smuggling, drawn into endeavors perceived to be relatively low-risk and high-reward;
• poachers would become more aware of references to high market prices in consumer countries and see this as an opportunity to negotiate a higher share of the revenue pie for the work they do as the foot soldiers of the industry. More money going to the poachers might prove an incentive for even more poachers to proffer their services;
• horn consumption would increase by creating an impression that rhinos are near extinction, a sort of “get in while stocks last” mentality;
• horn prices might rise – again based on fears of increasing scarcity.

As it stands, the five rhino species are all listed on CITES Appendix I, which means that any international trade in either live specimens or their body parts (including horn) is prohibited. By definition, therefore, any cross-border trade is illegal in terms of the CITES treaty, which is binding on all the party signatories.

There are, however, two exceptions in respect of the two African rhinos (See also Rhinos & CITES): 

• In 1995, the South African population of White Rhinos was downlisted to Appendix II, allowing for trade in live specimens to approved destinations and as hunting trophies. In 2005, this Appendix II status was extended to include the White Rhino population in Eswatini (formally known as Swaziland).

Although the Black Rhino continues to be listed in Appendix 1, in 2004 an exception was granted in respect of South Africa and Namibia, allowing for a small trophy-hunting quota. In terms of the permits granted for such hunts, a trophy may be exported to the hunter’s home country where it must remain in the owner’s possession and not sold on for any purpose. In practice this is a difficult condition to enforce (See The Journey of a Horn).[/vc_column_text][vc_column_text][/vc_column_text][/toggle][toggle color="Default" title="Changing the CITES status for rhinos"][vc_column_text]

The CITES Conference of the Parties (CoP) is the convention’s supreme decision-making body and it has an agreed set of biological and trade criteria to help determine whether a species should be included in Appendix I or II. At each CoP meeting, which takes place every two to three years, any Party is entitled to submit proposals to amend the status of a listed species. These proposals are discussed and then submitted to a vote. A proposal is only accepted if a two-thirds majority of the Parties present at the CoP are in its favor.

At a number of recent CoP meetings, proposals have been put forward to change the listing status of rhinos with the objective of opening the way for a legal trade in horn. These have, however, failed to gain the two-thirds majority required to be accepted, albeit on occasion by the narrowest of margins.

The next meeting of the Parties, CoP 18, was to have been held this year (2019) in Sri Lanka from 23 May to 3 June. Owing to recent religious extremist activities in the country, the CoP 18 meetings were postponed and will now take place in Geneva, Switzerland from 16-28 August 2019. So far, Namibia and Eswatini have made it known that they will be submitting proposals to change the listing status of their White Rhino populations (See CoP 18 Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II). Namibia has proposed to change the CITES status of its White Rhino population from Appendix I to Appendix II, which would allow international trade in live animals and in hunting trophies. Eswatini has proposed the removal of the existing conditions of the Appendix II listing of its White Rhino population, which would allow international trade in rhinos and their products – including horn and derivatives. [/vc_column_text][/toggle][/toggles]

Rhinos in zoos, sanctuaries and other captive circumstances also die from time to time and their horns, too, have to be securely sequestered. There are also horns, some antique and worked into pieces of art, that are part of museum, gallery and private collections, as well as horns taken as hunting trophies.

And then there are horns, whole or in pieces, seized from apprehended poachers and smugglers attempting to move them across national borders from countries of origin and through transit destinations. These too have to be secured.

There is, of course, also the significant amount of illegally taken horn that escapes detection. Some of this contraband is sold on to consumers in end-user countries, but much ends up in the stockpiles of criminal syndicates investing in the future value of horn. 

And finally, there is the “lost stockpile” of the wild – the unknown amount of horn that remains out in the field in remote parts of conservation areas as a result of mortalities that go undiscovered.

[/toggle][toggle color="Default" title="So how much horn is out there?"][vc_column_text]

Just how much horn is “out there” is very hard to establish given undiscovered natural mortalities and stockpiles in the hands of criminals. Regarding legally gathered horn, however, the situation should be different as stringent procedures are imposed regarding the recording of horns, their weight and measurement, the animals from which they are taken and where those animals, either alive or dead, are situated. DNA samples are also taken. A full set of recommendations for the proper cataloguing of 

all legally gathered horn is set out in great detail in Rhino Horn Stockpile Management: Minimum Standards And Best Practices From East And Southern Africa published in 2005 by TRAFFIC.

Most conservationists would agree, whether they support a legal trade or not, that a full, independently conducted and transparent audit of all legal stockpiles everywhere, whether in state agency or private hands, is an urgent requirement. Given the strict legal, step-by-step requirements of recording horn, this should not be a particularly difficult or time-consuming process, but it has proved frustratingly slow to happen.

Given that South Africa (state and private owners combined) remains the custodian of the overwhelming majority of all living rhinos, it is important that the country shows international leadership in all matters to do with rhino conservation, including an accurate and regularly updated audit of all stockpiled horn in the country. 

In 2017, South Africa’s former environmental affairs minister announced that her department was in the process of conducting an audit of all existing stockpiles, privately and government held, to ensure that the country had full and accurate information on the number of horns at any given time, as well as the registered owner of each. She further stated that an electronic database was being set up to capture details on all individual rhino horns in private hands and government-owned stockpiles, as well as all newly acquired horns. And in September 2018, the South African Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) announced that it had commenced with audits on private rhino horn stocks. Nearly a year later, no progress report has been released in this regard.[/vc_column_text][/toggle][/toggles]

Some countries, Mozambique, Kenya and Vietnam for instance, and zoos have already destroyed all or part of their stockpiles, while Australians have offered up privately owned rhino horn objects for destruction. Protagonists say that burning or crushing horn sends a clear message that horns belong to rhinos, not to people, and that they should have no value other than being attached to the nose of a living rhino. It is also suggested that the major destruction of existing stockpiles would drive a reduction in the illegal market value of horn, thereby making poaching a less profitable pursuit. 

“Many people cannot understand why destroying is the best thing to do with the rhino horns. When we burned ivory in Kenya at the end of the 1980s, its price dropped rapidly in about half a year as the demand for it was dramatically reduced.” Richard Leakey Doyen Conservationist

A further argument lies in destroying horn as soon as it is recovered, especially in countries and reserves where resources are few and endemic corruption is rife. This might prevent the horn from entering the contraband chain, but a system just as rigorous as for recording stockpiled horn would need to be in place – an unlikely scenario in the circumstances.

Yes, would be the immediate and emphatic response from countries and private owners who are pro-trade and who see their stockpiles as an increasingly valuable asset if a legal market for horn were to be established. This strong commercial imperative is bolstered by the argument that a major portion of the proceeds so gained could be used to meet the already high and rising cost of rhino protection, thereby creating a win-win situation. It has to be acknowledged that the better rhinos in a reserve are protected, the better all life forms in the reserve would be safeguarded.

But the keeping of horn stockpiles is not just about revenue and how that might be applied. DNA can be retrieved from horn and linked to individual rhinos. Such genetic evidence can and is used in the trials of alleged smugglers. 

Some of those opposed to destroying horn and ivory stockpiles contend that the destruction events are little more than publicity stunts and that far from reducing demand they simply drive up the price by creating a greater sense of rarity. Furthermore they advertise the fact that stockpiles exist and the types of institutions, such as zoos, where they are kept.

“I’m skeptical. It’s a PR stunt and reduces storage costs for governments … Ongoing destructions could backfire, reinforcing perceptions of ivory’s scarcity and supporting high black market prices. And doing this doesn’t generate sustainable financing for African parks, where it is desperately needed: It simply entrenches elephants as aid-dependent liabilities on a continent where they are losing ground to rapidly growing human populations, in relentless competition for space and resources.” Michael t’Sas-Rolfes, Independent Conservation Economist

Some conservation organizations – notably the African Rhino Specialist Group and Save the Rhino International – contend that the public hype around destroying stockpiles could have the unintended consequence of creating the impression that an already scarce substance is becoming even scarcer, thereby attracting greater criminal attention.

The moratorium seemed to have no effect on poaching, which over the next decade was to soar dramatically. It was also highly unpopular with South Africa’s pro-trade lobby, principally the private rhino owners who saw it as a further impediment in their quest for a legal trade to be established.

After a lengthy battle to have the moratorium set aside, spearheaded by John Hume, South Africa’s most influential rhino breeder, the complainants achieved their aim when, in 2015, a high court judge found in their favor. The judge maintained that the state had not followed the process of public participation before imposing the moratorium. However, the then minister of environmental affairs announced her intention to approach the Supreme Court and appeal the decision. In view of this, the judgment was suspended until the case had been heard.

In April 2017, the Supreme Court of Appeal refused the ministry’s leave to appeal the high court decision, thereby allowing rhino horn to be traded, domestically only, for the first time since 2009. Nevertheless, any trade would depend on a strict regime of permit issuing.

The anti-trade lobby reacted with some dismay, emphasizing that there was a minimal domestic market for horn and predicting that the lifting of the ban would result in even higher poaching as criminals found ways to use loopholes in the law to smuggle horn to markets in southeast Asia.

TRAFFIC commented that while it sympathized with the frustrations of private rhino owners, “… there is insufficient evidence to suggest that South Africa’s domestic rhino horn market would benefit rhino conservation. Instead, it is likely that the new legislation might further exacerbate the potential for criminal involvement, creating further enforcement challenges or even helping to drive higher levels of consumer demand.””[/vc_column_text][/toggle][/toggles]

The terms set by the government were that prospective buyers also had to have a permit to bid and buy and that the Department of Environmental Affairs would have access to the auction process to monitor compliance. The permit expressly did not authorize international trade in terms of the auction. The minister for environmental affairs was very clear on that point. Foreign buyers were able to participate in the auction, but any horn purchased had to stay in South Africa. 

The objective of the auction was clearly to realize much-needed cash for Hume who for years had born the high cost of protecting his rhino herd without any commercial payback. Any takers would be trading in a futures market, banking on an eventual legal market when they could realize a return on their investment.

The number of horns sold and to whom was not disclosed but the auction results were disappointing for Hume who blamed the outcome on the minister’s obstructiveness in only issuing a permit for theauction to go ahead at the eleventh hour. This, he believed, had discouraged potential buyers from registering in time. 

Those opposed to ending the moratorium and the auction criticized Hume for translating his auction website into Mandarin and Vietnamese, saying that he was sending mixed messages from South Africa to consumer markets in Asia by implying that buying horn was a good investment and by undermining demand reduction efforts in the region.